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Abstract: In this article, we present an online/offline identity-based short signature scheme using partial discrete logarithm (PDL). 
It is secure under unforgeability of identity-based short signature (IBSS) under chosen message attack (UF-IBSS-CMA) in random 
oracle. One of the interesting structures of our techniques is that it gives multi-time usage of the offline storage, which permits the 
signer to re-utilize the offline pre-processed info in polynomial time, as opposed to one-time usage in all past online/offline 
signature techniques. Our scheme is practical and feasible to be utilized in the wireless sensor network environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Shamir 32 presented the conceptual model of identity-based cryptography to make straightforward the key 
management difficulties in 1984. In above mention model, any known data of a client's identity can be used as a public 
key. A client's private key is created by a Private Key Generator (PKG) from the client's identity. It can diminish the 
complexity and expense for dealing with public key authentication development known as Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI). Applicable identity-based encryption techniques was not established until the notable contribution of Cocks10 
and Boneh and Franklin3. From that point forward, numerous protocols in this field have been produced including 
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numerous identity-based signature techniques1,5-7,16,18,29,30. On the other hand in these techniques, the public key of 
every client is not just an identity,  as well as few irregular number chose either by client or by reliable parties, which 
marks the identity-based cryptography a dynamic investigation domain in current years. 
   Even et al.12 introduced the concept of online/offline signatures. Their scheme implements the signature 
generation method in two stages. The principal stage is implemented offline (preceding the learning of the message to 
be signed), and the next stage is implemented online (later knowing the message to be signed). Even et al. also planned 
a general process for transforming any signature technique into an online/offline signature technique in12. But, the 
process is impracticable since it raises the measure of the signature by a quadratic component. Later, Shamir and 
Tauman33 projected another worldview called “hash-sign-switch” for planning more efficient online/offline signature 
techniques. Both techniques are in nonspecific setting, and therefore it is not actually practical or efficient to be 
utilized. Some actual operations have been suggested in4, 8, 14, 17, 19, 21. In the middle of these techniques,4 is the most 
efficient one 17 and19 are demonstrated to protect without random oracles. In any case, all techniques are just for 
customary public key-based setting, however not focused for identity-based setting. 
Meshram et al.25 presented efficient identity-based mechanisms based on discrete logarithm problem, generalized 
discrete logarithm problem and integer factorization problem. The security of this techniques are solving the hardness 
of discrete logarithm problem, generalized discrete logarithm problem and integer factorization problem 
simultaneously. Meshram and Meshram22, 23 investigate the new variants of identity-based beta cryptographic 
technique and transformation process such as public key cryptographic technique transfer to identity-based 
cryptographic (both encryption and signature) techniques without developing new identity-based techniques. 
Meshram24, 26 presented new provably secure identity-based cryptographic technique, new variant of identity-based 
beta cryptographic technique, and efficient technique based on integer factorization problem and discrete logarithm 
problem. Meshram and Obaidat27 also showed new variant of identity-based cryptographic technique such as 
quadratic-exponentiation randomized cryptographic technique. In past years, a few pairing based identity-based 
signature technique were also projected9, 15, 16, 31. Galindo and Garcia13 used the technique of concatenated Schnorr’s 
signature to develop an identity-based signature technique that works in the discrete logarithm problem setting but 
doesn’t require pairing. 
    Xu et al. introduced the idea of practicable identity-based online/offline signature technique34. In their technique, 
the signer desires to perform the offline stage each time when he needs to create a signature. We call it “one-time” 
which means the offline signature part can be utilized just once, and consequently, it can't be re-utilized. In addition, 
the verification of the Xu et al. technique needs a pairing operation, which is an unreasonable calculation process for 
a sensor node. Even more atrocious, it was in recent times found by Li et al.20 that the Xu et al. technique doesn’t 
accomplish the guaranteed security, i.e., the signature is forgeable. In other words, there is no protected solid identity-
based online/offline short signature technique existed in the literature yet. 
    As laid out above, we plan the efficient online/offline identity-based short signature (IBSS) technique based on 
PDL. Our presented technique permits the offline data to be re-usable. Along these lines, the signer is not required to 
implement the offline procedure all time when he/she needs to sign another message. Besides, not at all like a large 
portion of the current (non-identity-based) online/offline signatures, our offline signing procedure doesn’t require any 
private data from the signer. Consequently, it can be produced by any trusted outsider including the PKG. It is an 
existing identity-based setting, which doesn’t require any certificate joined to the signature for confirmation. It is 
demonstrated protected in the random oracle. 
The rest of this article is organized as fellows. Required background material is introduced in Section 2. Our 
efficient online/offline identity-based short signature technique based on PDL is presented in Section 3. The 
consistency of algorithm is explained in Section 4. Security investigation of new technique is discussed in Section 5. 
Lastly, Section 6 concludes the article. 
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2. Background and Material 
2.1.  Mathematical assumption 
    The security of our technique will be reduced to the complexity of the Partial Discrete Logarithm (PDL) issue in 
the group in which the signature is developed. We briefly review the definition.11, 28 
The Partial Discrete Logarithm (PDL) 
   Let ܰ ൌ ँऀ be a safe prime modulus, which means with ँ and ऀ are primes of the structure ऀ ൌ ʹऀǯ ൅ ͳ andँ ൌ
ʹँǯ ൅ ͳ, whereँǯ and ऀǯ are also primes. We indicate by ܵሺκሻ the arrangements of safe prime numbers of length κ. 
We consider ਽ ൌ ܴܳேమ  the cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo ܰଶ. We have ݋ݎ݀ሺ਽ሻ ൌ
ఒ൫ேమ൯
ଶ ൌ ऀऀ
ᇱँँᇱ ൌ
ேఒሺேሻ
ଶ ǡ with ߣሺܰሻ ൌ ʹँԢऀԢ. The maximal order of a component in this group is 
ேఒሺேሻ
ଶ , and each component of order ܰ 
is of the form ߙ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ݇ܰሻǤ 
 
Definition 1 (PDL):  Let ԭ  be a component of maximal order in ਽ . For straightforwardness, we assume that 
ԭఒሺேሻ݉݋݀ܰଶ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ܰሻ݉݋݀ܰଶ , that is ݇ ൌ ͳ . For given ԭ  and ݖ ൌ ԭ௔݉݋݀ܰଶ  (for some ܽ א ሾͳǡ ݋ݎ݀ሺ਽ሻሿ , 
Paillier28 defined the Partial Discrete Logarithm (PDL) as the computational problem of computing ܽሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ. We 
expect this issue is difficult (without the factorization of the modulus), as expressed in the accompanying suspicion. 
Assumption 1 (PDL over ࣴேమכ ). For every probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A, there exists a negligible 
function ݈݊݁݃ሺሻ such that for sufficiently large κ. 
 
 ቂܣሺܰǡ ԭǡ ݖሻ ൌ ܽሺ݉݋݀ܰሻȁऀǡ ँ ՚ ܵܲ ቀκଶቁ Ǣ ܰ ൌ ँऀǢ ԭ ՚ ਽Ǣ ܽ ՚ ሾͳǡ ݋ݎ݀ሺܩሻሿǢ ݖ ՚ ԭ
௔ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻቃ ൌ ሺκሻ  
3. The proposed online/offline IBSS Technique 
  We present our online/offline IBSS Technique in this section. It contains the following five components. 
3.1. Setup 
a. Select two huge prime numbers ँ and ऀ such that ܰ ൌ ँऀ and let ਽ be a multiple group of maximal order with 
generator ԭ such that ਽ ك ࣴேమכ Ǥ 
b. Choose an arbitrary ݔ ՚ ࣴேమכ  
c. Compute  ݖ ՚ ԭ௫ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ. 
d. Select hash functions ࣺ such that ࣺǣ ሼͲǡ ͳሽஶ ՜ ࣴேమכ  
 
The master public key (݉݌݇ሻ and master private key (݉ݏ݇ሻ are given by ሼ਽ǡ ԭǡ ܰଶǡࣺǡ ݖሽ and ݔ. 
3.2. Extract 
Given clients identity ࣻࣸ, the PKG performs the following: 
 
a. Chooses at random  ݈
ୖ
՚ࣴ୒మכ . 
b. Computes ࣛ ՚ ԭ௟.     
c. Computes ࣶ ՚ ࣺሺࣻࣸǡࣛሻ. 
d. Compute ः ՚ ݈ ൅ ࣶݔሺଶሻ. 
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The client’s private key is given by the pair ሺࣛǡ ःሻ. 
3.3. Offline Signing 
    At the offline stage, the singer performs the following:  
a. Computes ࣜ௝ᇱ ՚ ԭଶ
ೕሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ, for ݆ א ሾͲǡ ܰଶ െ ͳሿ 
3.4. Online Signing 
At the online stage, to sign a message ࣾ א  ሼͲǡ ͳሽכ, exhausting ሺࣛǡ ःሻthe signer proceeds as follows: 
a. Select ݎ ՚ ࣴேమכ  randomly so that  ݎ௝is the ݆th bit of ݎ 
b. Compute ࣜ ՚ ς ࣜ௝ିଵᇱே
మ
௝ୀଵ  . 
c. Compute ࣸ ՚ ࣺሺࣜǡࣛǡࣾሻ 
d. Compute ݕ ՚ ݎ ൅ ࣸःሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻand as well as ߜ ՚ ԭ௬ 
 
The signature of ࣾ is given by: ߪ ՚ ሺࣜǡࣛǡ ݕሻ. 
3.5. Verification 
To verify a signature ߪ ՚ ሺࣜǡࣛǡ ݕሻ on ࣾ and ࣻࣸ, the verifier proceeds as follows: 
a. Compute  ߜԢ ՚ ࣜࣛࣸݖࣶࣸ . 
b. If ߜ ൌ ߜԢ then signature is accepted; otherwise it is rejected. 
4. Consistency of the Algorithm 
The accurately created private key should satisfy the accompanying equality: 
 
                                                                   ԭः ൌ ݖࣶࣛ                                                                                        (1) 
 
For consistency of algorithm, note that ࣜ ൌ ԭ௥. We have: 
 
                     ࣜࣛࣸݖࣶࣸ ൌ ԭ௥ԭ௟ࣸԭ௫ࣶࣸ ൌ ԭ௥ା௟ࣸା௫ࣶࣸ ൌ ԭ௥ାࣸሺ௟ା௫ࣶሻ ൌ ԭ௥ାःࣸ ൌ ԭ௬                                  (2) 
5. Security analysis 
We demonstrate here the security of our planed online/offline IBSS technique using the rewinding technique 
invented by Bellare et al. in2. 
 
Theorem 1:  The presented IBSS technique is ሺ߳ǡ ݐǡ ݍாǡ ݍःǡ ݍࣺሻ protected in the logic of UF-IBSS-CMA in the 
random oracle, executing that the ሺ߳Ԣǡ ݐԢሻ -PDL hypothesis holds in G, where: 
 
߳ᇱ ൌ ቀ ଵ௤ࣺ െ
௤ಶା௤ः
ேమ ቁ ቀͳ െ
ଵ
ேమቁ ߳                                                                  (3) 
 
ݐᇱ ൌ ݐ ൅ ࣩሺݍः ൅ ݍாሻ߬                                                                        (4) 
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Andݍࣺǡ ݍः and ݍா are the quantity of hashing, signing and extraction inquiries, respectively. Also ߬ is the time for 
an exponentiation operation. 
 
Proof: Suppose that there exists a foe ृ. We build a procedure ि that makes use of ृ to solve PDL. The procedure 
ि is given a multiplicative group ܩ with generator ԭ and order ܰଶ, and a group component ߓ א ܩ. The procedure  ि 
is tested to find ߙ א ࣴேమכ  such that ԭఈ ൌ ߓ. We rely on the evidence method from2 
 
Setup: ि picks a hash function ࣺ, which acts similar to a random oracle. ि is accountable for the simulation of 
this random oracle. ि assigns ݖ ՚ ߓ and yields the public parameter ݌ܽݎܽ݉ ൌ  ሺܩǡ ܰǡ ԭǡ ݖǡ ࣺሻ to ृ. 
 
Extraction Oracle inquiries: ृ is permitted to inquiry the extraction oracle for an identity ࣻࣸ. ि simulates the 
oracle as follows. It picks ݑǡ ݒ א ࣴேమכ  at random and sets: 
 
ࣛ ՚ ݖ௨ԭ௩ ,  ः ՚ ݒ,   ࣺሺࣛǡ ࣻࣸሻ ՚ െݑ 
 
 ि  yields ሺࣛǡ ःሻ  as the private key of ࣻࣸ  and stores the estimation of ሺࣛǡ ःǡ ࣺሺࣛǡ ࣻࣸሻǡ ࣻࣸ ) in the table for 
consistency. 
 
Signing Oracle inquiries: The foe ृ inquiries the signing oracle for a message and an identity ࣻࣸ. ि first checks 
whether ࣻࣸ  has been inquired for the oracle ࣺ or extraction oracle before some time. If yes, it just recovers list 
ሺࣛǡ ःǡ ࣺሺࣛǡ ࣻࣸሻሻ from the table. Then ि uses these values to sign for the message, as per the signing procedure 
explained in the present technique. It yields the signature for the message as ሺࣜǡࣛǡ ݕሻ and keeps the ࣺሺࣜǡࣛǡࣾሻ list 
in the hash table for reliability. If ࣻࣸ hasn’t been inquired to the extraction oracle, then ि performs the simulation 
process of the extraction oracle by using the corresponding private key to sign the message. 
 
Output Calculation: At last, the foe ृ yields a fake signature ߪଵכ ൌ ሺࣜכǡࣛכǡ ݕଵכሻon identity ࣻࣸכand message ࣾכ. 
The procedure ि reverses ृ to the opinion where it inquiries ࣺሺࣜכǡࣛכǡࣾכሻ and deliveries with an alternate value. 
Foe ृ  yields an additional couple of signature ߪଶכ ൌ ሺࣜכǡࣛכǡ ݕଶכሻ . Foe ि  rehashes again and acquires ߪଷכ ൌ
ሺࣜכǡࣛכǡ ݕଷכሻ. Note that ࣜכand ࣛכought to be the same inevitably. We let ݓଵǡݓଶǡ ݓଷ be the yield of the random oracle 
inquiries ࣺሺࣜכǡࣛכǡࣾכሻ for sequentially three time. 
        By ݈ǡ ݔǡ ݎ א ࣴேమכ , we now signify PDL’s of ࣛǡ ݖ and ࣜ respectively, i.e., ࣛ ൌ ԭ௟ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ, ݖ ൌ ԭ௫ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻ 
and ࣜ ൌ ԭ௥ሺ݉݋݀ܰଶሻFrom Eq. (2), then we have 
                                       ݕ௜כ ൌ ݎ ൅ ݈ݓ௜ ൅ ݔܿ௜ࣺሺࣛכǡ ࣻࣸሻ݉݋݀ܰଶ for ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ 
In these mathematical statements, just ݎǡ ݈ǡ ݔ are unknown to foe ि. The foe ि evaluates for these values from the 
above linear independent mathematical statements for ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ and yields ݔ as the resolution of the PDL. 
 
Reduction Cost Analysis: The simulation process of the extraction oracle flops if the random oracle task 
ࣺሺࣛǡ ࣻࣸሻ causes irregularity. It occurs with probability at the most ௤ࣺேమ. Thus, the simulation process is effective ݍா ൅ݍः times (subsequent to ࣺሺࣛǡ ࣻࣸሻ and may likewise be inquired in the signing oracle, if ࣻࣸ hasn’t been inquired in 
the extraction oracle) with probability at least: 
 
൬ͳ െ ሺݍா ൅ ݍःሻݍࣺܰଶ ൰ ൑ ቀͳ െ
ݍࣺ
ܰଶቁ
௤ಶା௤ः
 
 
Because of the perfect arbitrariness of the random oracle, there exists an inquiry ࣺሺࣜכǡࣛכǡࣾכሻ with probability of 
no less than ቀͳ െ ଵேమቁ. Foe ि guesses, it is accurately as the purpose of rewind, with probability no less than ቀ
ଵ
௤ࣺ
ቁ. 
Hence, the overall effective probability is: 
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൬ ͳݍࣺ
െ ݍா ൅ ݍःܰଶ ൰ ൬ͳ െ
ͳ
ܰଶ൰ ߳ 
 
The time complexity of the procedure ि is ruled by the exponentiations executed in the extract and signing inquiries, 
which is equal to: 
ݐ ൅ ࣩሺݍः ൅ ݍாሻ߬ 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, we planned an efficient online/offline identity-based short signature technique using PDL that 
doesn’t require any certificate or authentication appended to the signature for confirmation and doesn’t require any 
pairing operation in both phase’s signature generation and verification. Our presented offline signing procedure 
doesn’t need any private key info. It can be pre- registered by a PKG. The offline info can likewise be re-utilized. It 
is also having very minimum operation in every process.   
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